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Introduction 
 
The day that humanity first reached outside its thin atmosphere was also the day that outer 
space became a subject of international politics. As Sputnik I, the Soviet Union's and planet 
Earth's first artificial satellite, was orbiting around the world, a minor crisis happened in the 
United States of America (US). The Soviet satellite sparked doubts about the safety of 
American soil to Soviet nuclear missiles. American politicians could no longer dismiss Russian 
technological prowess. Sputnik caused not only the Space Race, but also accelerated the 
arms race and worsened the Cold War between the two rival superpowers.1 
 Today the crisis caused by Sputnik almost seems exaggerated. Sputnik was a simple 
satellite, equipped with just a battery, a radio capable of sending a repeating beep, and four 
transmitters, all in an oversized ball. Now, thousands of satellites circle the Earth. These 
satellites provide pictures of Earth, communication, navigation and a wide variety of 
scientific data. Some are small enough to fit in your hand, some are as big as a bus, and one 
specific satellite is large enough to house six humans for months. This satellite, the 
International Space Station (ISS), is an international project by most of the major space 
faring states, and is often seen as the example of human cooperation in space. These states, 
each with various cultures, ideologies and international relations, have all provided 
manpower, resources, and components to the station.  
 The main contributors to the ISS program are Russia and the US, who build most of 
the station, provide the most funds and maintain the main launch capabilities for the 
program. Despite the historical and current cold relations between the two states, the 
program is dependent on the continuing support by both states.2 The US is currently even 
dependent on Russian rockets to get its own astronauts on the station. Almost all major 
space faring states, and even some relatively minor states (Brazil and Canada), have 
contributed to the ISS program, but one major state is missing: the People's Republic of 
China. It is not that China does not have the capabilities to support the space station. In fact, 
                                                             
 
1 Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (2002), 93-95. 
2 Eligar Sadeh, James P. Lester and Willy Z. Sadeh, 'Modeling international cooperation for space exploration', 
Space Policy 3 (1996), 220. 
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China is one of only three states which has ever send a man into space, and besides Russia 
the only state that still has the required capabilities to do so. China has been locked out of 
the ISS because of the American unwillingness to cooperate with them. A climate of non-
cooperation in space has formed between the two states. Note the use of the word 'non-
cooperation' instead of 'competition', as the latter implies the existence of a second space 
race or a situation close to conflict, an implication this thesis wants to avoid. The climate of 
non-cooperation materialized clearly in the 2011 budget for NASA, where NASA was 
explicitly forbidden to use any of its funding to cooperate with China or Chinese companies, 
or to host Chinese scientists in any of their buildings.3 So while the US is willing to closely 
cooperate with one of its rivals, it is completely unwilling to even consider cooperating with 
the other. 
 This raises the question that this thesis will try to answer: why and when do states 
cooperate with their rivals in space related issues? Cooperation between rivals is a very 
important subject for the study of international relations. Cooperation in one field can lead 
to cooperation in other areas. If rivals work together, it can improve their relationship and 
foster a bond of trust between the two states. The Apollo-Soyuz program is a good example 
of this. The program, in which American and Russian astronauts docked their spacecrafts 
together and shook hands in orbit, was considered a symbol of the period of détente. When 
rivals start to trust each other, tensions will be reduced and so will the chance of conflict. 
Understanding when states cooperate with their rivals could help better understand conflict 
and détente, as well as the formation or breaking up of power blocs. 
 Space as a backdrop to rival cooperation is interesting and important for several 
reasons. First of all, it is a relative new and developing theatre for international relations. But 
over time, space will become more important to international politics. This thesis will not go 
into the more exotic possibilities, such as colonization, as it is clear that Low Earth orbit is 
already filled with possibilities for international collaboration, competition and conflict. An 
especially important aspect of space is the increasing role of space assets in terrestrial 
conflicts. Satellites provide crucial intelligence, communication, reconnaissance and 
                                                             
 
3 Congress of the United States, Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 86, 
section 1340. 
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navigation to the armies, navies and air forces of space faring states.4 States will obviously 
try to protect their own space assets while trying to find a way to weaken those of their 
rivals and enemies. Furthermore, there are only a limited number of states with the 
capabilities to reach space. Space politics is largely done by these countries, which are 
mostly important regional or world powers. The relations between these powers can have a 
big impact on international relations in general, possibly shaping the world as we know it. 
 To research the question why states cooperate with their rivals in space, we will first 
look at theories on cooperation in general and some theories and models on space 
cooperation. It should be noted that space cooperation in this thesis refers to the political 
side of things, and not to the practical cooperation in orbit or between scientists. After this, 
we will study the cooperative relation between the US and Russia/the Soviet Union. Two 
cases will be highlighted: the establishment of space law in the Cold War, and the historical 
and current cooperation regarding the ISS. The first case has been chosen because the two 
states were clear rivals at the time. Yet the US and the Soviet Union set aside their 
differences to help create a series of multilateral treaties that form the basis of modern 
international space law, which is still generally followed by all space faring states today.5 This 
case will focus on two treaties, the successful Outer Space Treaty and the failed Moon 
Treaty. The case of the ISS happened after the end of the Cold War. The plans for the ISS 
were already mostly finished when the Soviet Union fell. So Russia became a part of the 
project at a relatively late stage, yet it was still a huge contributor. These cases of successful 
cooperation will be contrasted to the failure of cooperation between the US and China. Since 
there are no real case studies for American-Sino cooperation, this part will instead analyse 
the space related military strategies and interests of both states, and the US-China space 
relations. 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
4 Ashley J. Tellis, 'China's Military Space Strategy', Survival 3 (2007), 48. 
5 Nathan C. Goldman, 'Space Law', in: Sadeh ed., Space Politics and Policy: An Evolutionary Perspective 
(Dordrecht, 2002), 35. 
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Space cooperation and theories 
 
Before we can look at cooperation, we first have to define it in a political context. Robert 
Keohane in his landmark book on cooperation defines it as a situation where two states with 
initially incompatible policies adjust their policies so these policies become significantly more 
compatible.6 Keohane's book focuses primarily on international regimes which are long term 
structures of shared principles, norms, rules and decision making processes.7 As this is a 
thesis on why states cooperate and not so much on the how, the exact types of regimes and 
why states continue to follow them is less relevant than the question why states form 
regimes in the first place. 
 According to Stephen Krasner there are three main causal variables that lead to 
regime creation, egoistic self-interest, political power and norms and principles. Egoistic self-
interest is the most popular of these explanations. A state wants to increase their own 
resources and does not care much about those of other states, as long as those states do not 
intervene or help their interests. States cooperate to lower costs, increase information and 
reduce uncertainty.8 Political power can be a desire for more individual power or for a 
stronger system. Individual power protects the interests of the state, so if a regime protects 
those interests a state is willing to use its power to create or maintain that regime.9 Norms 
and principles that are vaguely shared amongst states are necessary for the creation of a 
regime.10 For example, before a regime of non-proliferation is created, states already have 
to agree that proliferation is something to be avoided. There are also two secondary causal 
variables which are not sufficient to create a regime but do increase the likelihood of one 
being created if some of the above three main variables are there: Usage and custom, and 
knowledge. Usage and custom are the expectations between states that are spontaneously 
                                                             
 
6 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, 
1984), 52-53. 
7 Stephen D. Krasner, 'Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables', in: Idem, 
International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983), 2. 
8 Krasner, 'Structural causes', 11-12. 
9 Idem, 13-16. 
10 Idem, 16-18. 
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created over time as the states interact.11 Rivals who do not cooperate are therefore less 
likely to do so later, as they do not expect the other to cooperate. New knowledge, such as 
the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine, can show the necessity of a new regime.12 
 However, regimes are generally created in what Keohane calls 'dense policy spaces', 
where there are a lot of closely related issues. Outer space is not a dense policy space, so ad 
hoc agreements tend to be better suited for cooperation, as they are easier to set up.13 The 
only true regime mentioned in this thesis, and one of the few regimes in space, is the space 
law regime. The ISS is also a long-term agreement, but is tied to the space station and not to 
principles and norms. When the space station itself inevitably retires, it will likely mean the 
end of the ISS project until (and if) new agreements are negotiated. So while the above 
reasons for regime formation can provide context for cooperation, they are likely not the 
entire answer. 
 There are also theories specific to cooperation in space. According to Eligar Sadeh et 
al. there are three initial conditions that determine how states think about cooperation 
regarding space research: science and technology, politics, and economics. Science and 
technology are the main reason behind space research and are the primary enablers of 
cooperation if there are no political or economic issues regarding the research. But if the 
technology has implications to political or economic security, it will reduce the likelihood of 
cooperation. Politics (and political events) determines how different political actors come 
together to create a cooperative relation between states. And economics finally determines 
how much can be invested in space research. If there is less money, there will be more 
cooperation to compensate for it.14 These conditions are combined with political actors, 
such as organizations, states, and regimes, to form cooperation. These conditions and their 
interaction with actors are however a bit vague, especially the political aspect. 
 By zooming further in, we can take a look at the role of America's space agency NASA 
in international cooperation. When NASA was founded, international cooperation was one 
                                                             
 
11 Krasner, 'Structural causes', 19. 
12 Idem, 20. 
13 Keohane, After Hegemony, 79. 
14 Sadeh et al., 'Modeling international cooperation', 209-210. 
7 
 
 
of its main goals.15 Space historian Roger Launius has listed several political reasons why the 
US wanted to cooperate. Firstly, they wanted to create and maintain a positive international 
image. Secondly, they wanted to improve their relations with their allies and other strategic 
partners. Third, the US wanted to emphasise the openness of their government in 
comparison to the closed space program and government of the Soviet Union. And finally, 
they wanted to use space cooperation as a diplomatic tool for other goals. Furthermore 
there are two economic reasons for cooperation: reduced costs and more markets for 
aerospace products.16 Stephen and Lisa Shaffer differentiate between symbolic and 
pragmatic goals. The political goals noted by Launius are all symbolic goals, and the Shaffers 
add to these the goal of controlling space capabilities and legitimizing space policies. Launius 
economic goals fit in the pragmatic goals, which also include the access to foreign know how 
and some control over foreign development of potentially dangerous space technology.17 
 Aside from these goals, NASA also had a set of guidelines to international 
cooperation, again summed up by Launius. The first guideline was that cooperation was on a 
project-to-project basis, so NASA did not agree with any agreements over multiple projects. 
Second, the project had to be of use not only to both parties, but also to science in general. 
Two related guidelines were that the scientific data would be available to all parties and that 
the scientific aspect had to be agreed on before requesting political commitment. The final 
two guidelines were that the project was clearly divided between the states, with both 
states funding and managing their own part separately. The final guidelines are important, 
as this ensures that NASA is not dependent on other states. NASA always wants to be the 
only party responsible for 'mission critical components', the parts that are essential for 
mission success.18 NASA followed these guidelines closely during the Cold War. 
 
 
                                                             
 
15 Roger Handberg, 'Rationales of the Space Program', in: Sadeh ed., Space Politics and Policy,  35. 
16 Roger D. Launius, 'United States Space Cooperation and Competition: Historical Reflections', Astropolitics 2 
(2009), 93-94. 
17 Stephen M. Shaffer and Lisa Robock Shaffer, The Politics of International Cooperation: A Comparison of U.S. 
Experience in Space and in Security (Denver, 1980), 46-48. 
18 Launius, 'Cooperation and Competition', 94-96. 
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The establishment of space law 
 
When spaceflight became reality, both the US and the Soviet Union realized that they had to 
agree on certain rules. The Soviet Union called for the United Nations to act as a neutral 
third party to supervise the peaceful use of space, and the US agreed. In December 1958, a 
year after Sputnik, the UN established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS). After some political problems, COPUOS finally convened in 1961 and 
proposed resolution 1721 which stated that international law would apply to space and all 
celestial bodies and that all states were free to peacefully explore and use space. It was the 
first formal document on space law.19 
 Later treaties expanded space law to be more than just an extension of international 
law. COPUOS negotiated and agreed on several major treaties, which form the basis of 
modern space law. The first and most important treaty is the Outer Space Treaty. This treaty 
established most of the rules and principles governing outer space and has been ratified and 
signed by most states, including all space faring states. The final attempted treaty, the Moon 
Treaty, stands in stark contrast to the Outer Space Treaty. The Moon Treaty was an attempt 
to further define the laws pertaining to the moon and other celestial bodies. Yet so far only 
sixteen states have ratified this treaty, and none of them are major space faring states. This 
chapter will analyze why the Outer Space Treaty worked and the Moon Treaty failed. 
 The Outer Space Treaty has been described as a "key development" of international 
law20. An article written shortly after the treaty was finalized called the treaty "a remarkable 
endeavour of great significance to international law and politics" partially because "[n]ations 
often in conflict with one another and adhering to widely divergent political philosophies 
have agreed on the first Treaty (...) governing activity in outer space."21 The treaty provided 
a fundament for future space treaties, often purposefully being vague about certain subjects 
which would be the subject of later treaties. The treaty formalized three key ideas. First, that 
                                                             
 
19 Dolman, Astropolitik, 125-127. 
20 Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (Farnham, 2009), 54. 
21 Paul G. Dembling and Daniel M. Arons, 'The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty', The Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce 1 (1967), 420. 
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all general international laws were applicable to space. Second, that space was free for the 
exploration and use of all states, including non-signatories. And third, that no state was 
allowed to claim parts of space of celestial bodies as its sovereign territory, regardless of the 
presence of a base or the use of the area.22 
 In May 1966 the US first proposed a treaty on celestial bodies. The Soviets agreed 
and offered their own proposal for such a treaty, but later expanded it to also include outer 
space, the great void in between planets and moons. These proposals formed the basis for 
the negotiations through COPUOS that followed later the same year. The articles containing 
the key ideas summed up above were quickly adopted from the Soviet proposal, as most 
states already agreed on this.23 Other articles from the Soviet draft were inspired by earlier 
treaties and were also accepted with relatively little trouble aside from some minor changes 
to gain the support from the Americans. Article IX, stating that states should aid each other 
and should try to prevent obstructing the activities of others, was a combination of the 
American and Soviet proposal that also had little resistance.24 Articles XI and XII were 
proposed by the Americans and were accepted with some concessions to the Soviets.25 The 
main issues were article IV and X, respectively an American and Soviet proposal. 
 The American proposed Article IV banned the use and storage of weapons of mass 
destruction in space, and the stationing and use of military forces on celestial bodies. 
Interesting is that the stationing of military forces is not forbidden in outer space, as both 
the Soviet Union and United States wanted to prevent a debate on the military satellites 
they both had circling the globe. There was a linguistic dispute surrounding the terms 'bases' 
and 'fortifications', with the Russian translations considered to be too specific. The Soviet 
proposal to replace them with 'installations' on the other hand was considered too vague by 
the US. More serious was the question if military resources could be used in space. The 
Soviet Union opposed this as a loophole to the "fundamental provision" of using space for 
purely peaceful purposes. They had finally to concede to the Western argument that many 
                                                             
 
22 Lyall and Larsen, Space Law, 59-61. 
23 Dembling and Arons, 'Outer Space Treaty', 429. 
24 Idem, 435-441. 
25 Idem, 445-449. 
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peaceful space resources, such as the rocket, were initially developed by the military, while 
the US conceded on the linguistic debate.26 
 The Soviet proposal for Article X stated that states that allowed another state to use 
its earth observation facilities to track satellites should also allow all other states to do the 
same. So if Chile allowed the US access to its observatories, it also had to allow the Soviet 
Union and China if those states so desired. This proposal was an issue as it reduced a nations 
sovereignty, especially for non-space faring states that could not expect anything in return, 
and it was feared that this could kill the treaty. The US also argued that this would weaken 
the treaty as a whole, as it discouraged cooperation and set specific rules instead of 
principles. But the Soviets had a good reason to push for this article: to keep a satellite under 
surveillance for its entire orbit, a state needs observatories spread across the globe. The 
Soviet bloc was mostly located in central Eurasia, while the US had territories and allies in all 
four hemispheres. This gave the US a clear advantage in space affairs. The Soviets tried to 
compromise while halting the final agreements on the last two articles, but the resistance to 
their proposal was too strong. They finally conceded after bilateral talks with the US, saving 
the treaty just before it would be reviewed by the General Assembly. States would now 
"consider on a basis of equality any requests by other States", giving them much more room 
in negotiations.27 The Outer Space Treaty was accepted by the General Assembly and ratified 
by a majority of UN states, including all space faring states. 
 The Moon Treaty was the last of the major space law treaties, and the only one to 
fail. The treaty was supposed to formalize the rules and principles regarding the use and 
exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies in the solar system. Negotiations started 
in May 1971, when the Soviet Union proposed the treaty. But unlike the Outer Space Treaty 
which took less than a year from proposal to ratification, the Moon Treaty was not finished 
until December 1979.28 Most of the articles in the treaties were negotiated in a similar way 
as the Outer Space Treaty, some quickly accepted, others with minor debates and 
                                                             
 
26 Dembling and Arons, 'Outer Space Treaty', 434-435. 
27 Idem, 442-444. 
28 Nancy L. Griffin, 'Americans and the Moon Treaty', The Journal of Air Law and Commerce ? (1981), 734-735. 
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concessions.29 But Article 11, regarding the use and exploitation of resources on the moon, 
proved to be the treaty's undoing.30 
 The issues with this Article started during negotiations. The American delegation 
proposed the article, while the Soviets questioned the relevance of the article as exploitation 
of lunar resources was not considered feasible in the near future. The Americans argued that 
it was best to prevent future problems by formalizing the rules before national interests 
would complicate negotiations.31 The Soviet Union also complained about the use of the 
term 'common heritage of mankind' in regards to resources, as it was not defined in the 
treaty and was considered to be a 'capitalist' notion because of the connection to 
inheritance law.32 The discussion surrounding this article was not resolved until the Austrian 
delegation finally proposed a compromise in 1979. The term 'common heritage' would stay 
in the article, but the establishment of a regime to supervise the exploitation of resources 
was delayed until "such exploitation is about to become feasible."33 This compromise was 
accepted by both the US and Soviet Union, and the treaty passed through the General 
Assembly. 
 But the treaty's future was not decided in the international theatre of politics, but in 
a national one. Surprisingly, despite Soviet opposition against and American support for 
article 11, the troubles were on the American side. The treaty was supported by all relevant 
government institutions, but it was opposed by the National Association of Manufacturers 
and several organisations and companies from the (aerospace) industry. Interesting is the 
position of the American Bar Association of lawyers, where the International Law section 
agreed with the treaty while the Natural Resources Law section disagreed.34 Opponents of 
the treaty argued that article 11 implied a moratorium on the extraction of lunar resources 
until a regime was set up. The term 'common heritage', again supported by the US, proved 
to be a problem. At the time the treaty was debated, negotiations regarding the UN 
                                                             
 
29 Griffin, 'Americans and the Moon Treaty', 736-741. 
30 Note that the numbering of the articles changed from Roman to Arabic numerals between the treaties. 
31 Idem, 743-744. 
32 Fabio Tronchetti, The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: A Proposal 
for a Legal Regime (Leiden, 2009), 50. 
33 United Nations General Assembly, 'Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies' [Moon Treaty], in: United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space (New York, 2002), 32. 
34 Griffin, 'Americans and the Moon Treaty', 749 and 754, note 167 and 204. 
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Convention on the Law of the Sea were ongoing, and a debate on the 'common heritage' of 
the seas was part of this. It became clear that many states had different interpretations of 
this phrase than the US, with developing countries opposing the exploitation of submarine 
resources. The opposition of the Moon Treaty feared that this definition would also be 
applied to the moon.35 They also feared that the negotiations of the new regime would be 
dominated by the developing world with the support of the Soviet Union to facilitate a 
redistribution of the world's wealth.36 This was not entirely unfounded as the treaty did call 
for the regime to share the wealth from the resources equally among all state parties with 
special consideration for the space faring states and developing countries.37 Despite the 
government's insistence that the Soviet Union did not support the definition from the 
developing states, the opposition won the debate when president Reagan's administration 
joined their side, and the US never ratified the treaty. The Soviet Union had agreed with the 
treaty despite its misgivings on the 'common heritage', so it is no surprise they also did not 
ratify after the US failed to do so because of the very same reason. At that point there was 
little reason for other states to sign the treaty, as the US and Soviet Union dominated 
space.38 
 The Outer Space Treaty was an example of compromise between two rival powers. 
Though multilateral, its debates were dominated by the differences in opinion between the 
American and Soviet delegation. But concessions and compromises by both sides made the 
treaty the corner stone of space law. The Moon Treaty was plagued by discussion regarding 
just one of its articles until it was finally agreed upon by all governments. It was the 
American political system that deemed the treaty unacceptable, even though the 
government had already given it its blessing. President Reagan saw the end of the Moon 
Treaty, but he did start something else: the first International Space Station. 
 
                                                             
 
35 Tronchetti, Natural Resources of the Moon, 56-61. 
36 Griffin, 'Americans and the Moon Treaty', 752-754. 
37 UN, 'Moon Treaty', 32. 
38 Tronchetti, Natural Resources of the Moon, 59-61. 
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Russia and the International Space Station 
 
The International Space Station (ISS) is a seemingly ideal example of multilateral cooperation 
to achieve a greater good. But like many other examples of cooperation, the reasons for 
cooperating is less idealistic and more practical. The ISS started as Space Station Freedom 
(called ISS from now on for clarity), the newest of American space stations. NASA started 
talks with other space agencies in 1982, but it was not until 1984 that these talks became 
officials by order of president Reagan. While the station was an international project, it was 
still very much American. The first few agreements regarding the ISS show four indications 
that the station was American. First, the US would be the one to build and maintain the core 
of the station, including all essential elements such as life support and  solar panels. Second, 
every partner state was responsible for the management and funding of its own research 
and hardware. Third, the US had the final decision-making authority if a multilateral decision 
could not be made. And finally, NASA hoped to try and prevent unnecessary transfer of 
technology to other states.39 Basically, the ISS would have been an American station with 
some European and Japanese laboratories attached to it. Interestingly, at the beginning of 
the negotiations the other states hoped to reach a truly multilateral agreement with equal 
authority for all states. But the fact that the US was the only state capable of building and 
funding the station and providing transportation, the other states had to delegate more 
power to the Americans.40 But while a final agreement was reached in 1988, the costs 
proved too prohibitive for the American congress and NASA started a series of redesigns to 
lower the costs.41 
 The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union provided a way to not only 
lower the cost of the ISS, but also to stabilize the world. Russia had extensive experience 
with the construction and maintenance of space stations and had the required infrastructure 
and industry to help with the ISS. Russian participation to the program would also improve 
                                                             
 
39 Sadeh et al., 'Modeling international cooperation', 219. 
40 Lynn F.H. Cline and Graham Gibbs, 'Re-negotiation of the International Space Station Agreements - 1993-
1997', Acta Astronautica 11 (2003), 918. 
41 Sadeh et al., 'Modeling international cooperation', 220. 
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Western relations with Russia as it was a symbolic end to the Cold War, a way to show 
Western support to the Russian political and economic reforms and as it would improve 
economic ties between the former rivals.42 Finally it would reduce the instability brought by 
the sudden change in power relations. Russian scientists and the aerospace industry were 
looking for work, and many states were hoping to obtain former Soviet rocket technology. If 
Russia would start work on the ISS, these scientists and industries would work on more 
peaceful technology that would be a boon rather than a threat to the West. It is no accident 
that Russia joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR, a regime aimed at 
reducing missile technology proliferation) at the same time it joined the ISS program.43 
 In 1993 the US formally invited Russia to the ISS, and multilateral negotiations were 
organised in Paris. Initially, it was expected that Russia would become a full member of the 
agreement reached in 1988 with relatively few changes, as the states wanted to prevent a 
long phase of negotiations.44 But because the ISS had to be redesigned, because Russia and 
the European Space Agency wanted more influence to balance their potential contributions, 
and because the previous agreement still had some outstanding issues, the agreement had 
to be renegotiated.45  
 Some of the negotiations were multilateral, but the Russian and American space 
programs also met in bilateral talks focused on the political and legal aspects of the treaty. 
These aspects centred around the control of the station, and how much influence Russia 
would have on the decision making process. Alexander Yakovenko was the leader of the 
Russian delegation and wrote an article about the negotiations. He described the meetings 
as dynamic and flexible, and the general atmosphere as optimistic.46 In 1994 the first 
agreements were reached, giving Russia more authority and already sending orders to 
Russian industries to start working on ISS related products. While this shows some 
willingness to compromise to Russia, the US was still unwilling to allow Russia to work on the 
                                                             
 
42 Eligar Sadeh, 'Technical, organizational and political dynamics of the International Space Station program', 
Space Policy 3 (2004), 185-186. 
43 Stephen N. Whiting, 'Space and Diplomacy: A New Tool for Leverage', Astropolitics 1 (2003), 63; Sadeh, 
'Dynamics of the ISS', 186. 
44 Cline and Gibbs, 'Re-negotiation of the ISS', 920-921. 
45 Idem, 922; Alexander V. Yakovenko, 'The intergovernmental agreement on the International Space Station', 
Space Policy 15 (1999), 81. 
46 Yakovenko, 'Agreement on the ISS', 81. 
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core part of the station, the modules containing life support and other essential systems. 
NASA was willing to let Russia work on 'critical path components', breaking a guideline it had 
followed until then, but Russia would stay dependent on the American part of the station 
and not the other way around. Russia proposed a compromise: they would build an 
autonomous part of the station, effectively creating two independent cores. But NASA 
wanted an integrated program and finally allowed Russia to work on the station core.47 
 The final ISS agreement reached in 1998 gave a lot more authority to the other states 
that participated to the program. The US was still the leader of the project and was 
responsible for decisions that had an impact on the safety of the station. For other decisions 
a multilateral solution was preferred, but if no consensus could be reached the US had the 
final say. The station was divided in a Russian and American part, and if Russia disagreed 
with the American decision it would only apply to the American half. Similarly, the previous 
agreement on the ISS stated that all astronauts onboard the station would fall under 
American law. The new agreement stated that astronauts would fall under the jurisdiction of 
their own nation, unless they harmed an astronaut or damaged material from another 
state.48 Where Space Station Freedom would have been an extension of American 
sovereignty and its hegemony, the International Space Station had become a truly 
international affair. 
 But Russia's participation had its flaws. The biggest problem was the instability of 
Russia's political system and economy. While the program might help stabilize things, it 
obviously only played a minor role in Russia's domestic theatre. The ISS could not stop a 
failing Russia and if that happened would likely fail as well. The Russian financial crisis in 
1999 caused the Russian space program to declare bankruptcy. NASA had to step in and 
drastically increase the funding for an earlier project to 600 million dollars to allow Russia to 
continue the program, despite NASA's guideline to reduce the transfer of funds as much as 
possible.49 NASA also started development of a replacement for one of the critical 
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components Russia was supposed to produce. This proved to be unnecessary, although 
Russia was still two years late with this part of the project.50  
 To get Russia to join the ISS America had to compromise on their initial expectations 
of the project. Russia was given more authority and was given the responsibility of building 
and maintaining mission critical parts of the station, and that despite the fact that Russia's 
participation carried risks. NASA had to abandon several of its guidelines on cooperation it 
had maintained throughout the Cold War, including a large transfer of money to aid the 
failing Russian space agency. The US was clearly willing to go a long way to cooperate with 
its (former) rival to improve global stability, but the same cannot be said about the American 
relationship with China. 
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Sino-American space relations 
 
China's space program has had problems since its inception in 1956. Just like the American 
and Soviet programs, space was at first secondary to the project. China wanted to develop 
its own ballistic missiles to deliver a Chinese nuclear warhead. Initially these projects were 
combined in a national effort with the phrase "two bombs, one satellite," an effort to 
internally produce an atomic bomb, a hydrogen bomb and a satellite. Worsening relations 
with the Soviet Union thwarted this effort however, as the withdrawal of Soviet advisors 
meant that China could not continue such a large scale project. Unsurprisingly, the satellite 
was the first project to be scrapped, and the Cultural Revolution delayed the project after 
the bombs had been developed. The space agency, now under military control to reduce the 
impact of the Cultural Revolution, finally managed to launch a satellite in 1970, making China 
the fifth state with a self-launched satellite. Budget cuts in 1978 slowed the program once 
again until a national plan focusing on high-tech R&D in 1986 revitalized it. The fall of the 
Soviet Union gave China access to cheap Soviet technology and allowed them to sell their 
launch services on the global market. China's program has steadily advanced in the past 
decades, even creating its own manned space program, although it is still somewhat behind 
on the major space states.51 
 One reason why the Chinese have invested so much in the space program lately is 
because the program gives them international prestige and respect.52 This is not unique to 
the Chinese space program, as one of NASA's main goals was the same, and the Space Race 
during the Cold War was also largely about prestige rather than direct strategic benefits.53 
Mao Zedong ordered that China's first satellite was larger and more practical than the first 
satellites of the Soviets and Americans, and the same happened with the first manned 
mission. Chinese experts often mention the cooperation with Russia and Europe, implying 
that they are equals to these advanced space agencies. And China was one of the main 
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founders of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). APSCO is 
headquartered in Beijing and servers as an instrument of China to improve relations with 
other states and to legitimize its claim as a peaceful growing power.54 
 Although prestige is an important reason for the space program, most foreign experts 
tend to focus on its role in China's military strategy. While most space agencies worldwide 
have a close working relation with the military, China is the only major state were the agency 
is directly supervised by the military. China's military space program ties directly into its 
grand strategy. In the past few decades China has been rising in power, and the government 
fears that the US will try and contain China before it can threaten the American hegemonic 
position. China is especially worried about the safety of its shipping lanes on which its 
economy depended, and which could potentially be blockaded by the superior American 
navy. Chinese strategy is to prevent the US from effectively operating in the seas near 
China.55 To achieve this, China has to be able to take on the American conventional forces if 
necessary, and since they are not capable of doing this in a direct confrontation China is 
looking for indirect ways to achieve this goal.56 One indirect way lies through space. 
 To understand this we need to take a short look at the American military grand 
strategy. During the late Cold War, the Soviet Union was out producing the 'Arsenal of 
Democracy', causing the US to pivot to a grand strategy of qualitatively superior forces. A 
combination of information superiority and rapid communication would allow the Americans 
to deploy their forces and high-tech weapons for maximum efficiency.57 Satellites proved to 
be essential for information acquisition, communications and navigation. They have been 
called "the relatively vulnerable eyes, ears and voice of American power," highlighting both 
their strength and weakness.58 China discovered this after analyzing recent US wars, 
especially the first Gulf war, in which satellites gave the US a decisive advantage. This lead 
China to believe that the outcome of a war with the US would be determined by who had 
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information superiority, and that control over space assets was crucial to achieve this 
advantage.59 This view is clearly present in a quote from a study by the People's Liberation 
Army Air Force: "It is impossible to achieve national security without obtaining space 
security."60 
 Unsurprisingly, the Chinese space strategy has been cause for concern amongst 
American military experts, while others are more concerned about how the US treats China's 
space program. At least one US expert on China's military thinks that China want to achieve 
space dominance, and not just the ability to deny space superiority to its foes.61 Others 
consider China's space program as a potential driver behind a space arms race between the 
US and China.62 James Moltz notes that "although U.S. military space documents rarely 
identify possible adversaries by name, China is clearly one state of concern."63 While Moltz 
then sums up other states that pose a potential threat to the US, the fact that he singles out 
China shows that it is considered a bigger threat in space than Iran, North Korea, or even the 
advanced Russian space program. Joan Johnson-Freese, a space strategy expert who 
expands on Moltz' introductory article, argues that American military experts tend to use 
Cold War models and ideas when thinking about new threats such as China's space program. 
Because the US already has a double-edged relation with China due to a powerful though 
informal anti-Chinese coalition, Johnson-Freese thinks that America's position to the Chinese 
space program will be especially tense. She says that "at present, space is one of the last 
remaining venues of Cold War politics."64 Johnson-Freese's article was written in 2006, and 
relations have not improved since then, as NASA has been forbidden to work with China. 
 The bill that banned cooperation between NASA and China was the Department of 
Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act of 2011. As the name suggests, the bill 
was a standard yearly bill that ensured that the Department of Defense and associated 
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institutions were funded, so the ban on cooperation was a small rider on a bill that had to be 
passed. Section 1340 (of over three thousand sections) states that NASA is not allowed to 
use its funds to cooperate with China or any Chinese-owned company in any way unless 
specifically authorized by a law.65 Later appropriation acts regarding NASA copied the 
section almost directly, but added another way in which the limitations could be bypassed. 
NASA would have to certify that the mission "pose[s] no risk of resulting in the transfer of 
technology, data, or other information with national security or economic security 
implications", and that it "will not involve knowing interactions with [Chinese] officials who 
(...) have direct involvement with violations of human rights." These certifications had to be 
submitted to Congress or the Federal Bureau of Investigations.66 Although it is not explicitly 
stated, one can assume that these institutions could stop the mission if they disagreed with 
NASA's judgement, or could punish NASA or those responsible if they did not adhere to 
these standards. This process clearly discourages cooperation with China, as there are other 
states with who NASA can cooperate without having to jump through bureaucratic hoops 
and taking additional political risks. 
 The ban on collaboration fits in a pattern of non-cooperation with China, a pattern 
that started with the events on Tiananmen Square. Before those events, the US was willing 
to cooperate with the Chinese space program by transferring space technologies. This was 
done to widen the Soviet-Chinese rivalry, which would strengthen the American position in 
the world. But the fall of the Soviet Union and the Tiananmen Square protests abruptly 
ended the cooperative atmosphere.67 In 2001 China showed interest in joining the ISS 
project and, as they called it, the "international family of space faring nations."68 At the time, 
the US vetoed the possible participation of China. Some Chinese scholars had hopes that the 
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Obama administration would allow China to join, or would at least improve space relations, 
but the 2011 ban put a stop to that.69 
 There are three recurring reasons why the US does not want to cooperate with 
China: disapproval of Chinese human rights issues and political system, national security 
issues, and the possible transfer of dangerous technology to China. The first issue, that of 
domestic issues in China, may seem unrelated to space but is clearly a driving issue behind 
the ban on cooperation. As noted before, NASA has to prove it will not interact with Chinese 
"officials who (...) have direct involvement with violations of human rights" if it wants to 
cooperate with China.70 The author of the ban was Representative Frank Wolf, who was at 
the time the chairman of the subcommittee responsible of funding NASA.71 He has written 
several letters to NASA administrator Charles Bolden on cooperation with China. In one 
letter he starts with a long explanation of the human rights issues in China and on his work 
to improve the situation there, stating that he has: "... supported efforts to limit new 
collaboration with China until we see improvements in its human rights record." 
Interestingly, he also responds to criticism of the ban by Dr. Geoffrey Marcy with the 
question if Marcy has done anything to improve human rights in China.72 
 But why do human rights matter for space cooperation? An important reason is that 
the US, just like many other Western governments, often tries to spread its own principles to 
other states. The international outrage caused by Tiananmen Square led to major 
technological sanctions, despite the event having little to do with foreign technology. 
Another, related, reason has to do with how American democracy works. Representatives 
represent their district, and very few districts care about the space industry, space politics or 
space in general. This means that ideology becomes much more important. Since there are 
so few representatives who are willing to spend political capital on space issues, and so 
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many who oppose China for a variety of reasons, American space politics tend to favour non-
cooperation with China even for unrelated reasons.73 
 This is not to say that non-cooperation is founded only on ideological reasons. The 
second reason of national security is much more practical and equally, if not more, 
important. Frank Wolf also touches extensively on this subject in his letters, pointing out the 
military applications of the Chinese space program74 and its development of Anti-Satellite 
weapons (ASAT).75 "Serious concerns about widespread espionage [by China] (...) as well as 
recent developments in China's space warfare program" are stated as  reasons for the ban.76 
The US-Chinese strategic military rivalry and tension has already been expanded on earlier, 
and these fears are certainly not unfounded. 
 The third reason for non-cooperation, the issue of American technology being 
transferred to China, is closely related to the reason of national security. The two reasons 
are considered separate as technology transfer is directly related to collaboration and also 
has implications on global security. This issue is often considered to be the main reason for 
non-cooperation.77 Since many space technologies have both a civilian and military purpose, 
transfer of civilian technology can lead to military developments in China. While this is a 
problem in and of itself, it could also lead to proliferation of these technologies to other 
states. There is a lot of uncertainty about China's stance towards non-proliferation. Officially, 
China follows the rules of the non-proliferation regimes, but a lack of transparency means 
that it can be hard to be sure.78 And many US experts and politicians already do not trust 
China, due to Chinese cyber espionage attempts and the 1999 Cox report. 
 The Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and 
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, named the Cox report 
after the Committee's chairman, was a report on the transfer of potentially dangerous 
technology to China through cooperation and espionage. The report was written in 1999 
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after two American companies offered advice to China's space program when the Chinese 
had failed to successfully launch satellites for these companies. Representatives feared that 
this information could be used by China to improve its ballistic missiles, leading to the Cox 
report.79 The report's conclusions most relevant to this thesis are that China has "stolen or 
otherwise illegally obtained U.S. missile and space technology that improves [China's] 
military and intelligence capabilities"80, that China wants to obtain US technologies "by any 
means"81, and that China "has proliferated such military technology to a number of other 
countries, including regimes hostile to the United States."82 According to critics the report 
had little evidence to back its claims, and that those claims were mostly 'worst case' 
interpretations of the available evidence.83 Nevertheless, and frankly unsurprisingly, these 
conclusions caused consternation amongst American politicians. This led to laws restricting 
the export of satellites and other forms of space technology, most notably the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) which even limited export of satellites to American allies.84 
Even ten years after the report, its legacy is still alive as at least one Senator pointed at the 
Cox Report to warn Europe against cooperating with China.85  
 The American climate of non-cooperation with China is grounded on both a strategic 
military rivalry in space and issues of domestic politics. China is specifically designing its 
space capabilities with a war with the US in mind. Regardless of the legitimacy of their fear, 
this has worsened space relations with the US and gives America a genuine reason not to 
cooperate with China on space related matters. The US is also guilty of creating the pattern 
of non-cooperation, as the American system of democracy tends to favour ideology when it 
comes to space. While this means that taxpayers are less likely to have to pay for needless 
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space adventures, it also means that politicians actively worsen space relations with China 
for unrelated reasons. Banning Chinese participation to the ISS is unlikely to free any Chinese 
dissidents, regardless of the arguments by the proponents of the ban. Furthermore, genuine 
problems with technology transfers are worsened by overly dramatic reports. 
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Conclusion 
 
The instances of cooperation described above scratch only the surface of space cooperation. 
The multilateral space agency ESA, the American-Soviet symbolical Apollo-Soyuz mission, 
and the many international scientific cooperative missions are all examples of cooperation 
that have not been mentioned in this thesis. But the examples that were mentioned are 
some of the most important cases of (non-)cooperation in space politics. The US and Soviet 
Union stood at the cradle of international space law with the COPUOS and Outer Space 
Treaty, only for this cooperative relation to end due to bickering regarding a single article in 
the Moon Treaty. The ISS is an example of successful collaboration between former rivals 
who are still unsure about their relation. The US was willing to compromise greatly on its 
expectations and guidelines to get Russia into the project, to ensure better bilateral relations 
and to improve global stability after the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War also 
saw the end of a somewhat cooperative space relation between the US and China, and the 
beginning of a climate of non-cooperation. So why do states sometimes cooperate with their 
rivals, and why do they sometimes not? 
 One of the most important reasons why the US is unwilling to cooperate with China is 
the fear of technology transfer. While the US also wanted to reduce the risk of transfer when 
working together with Russia on the ISS, the issue was not as important. It was not an issue 
that was brought up in negotiations, even though building a space station together would be 
one of the most risky missions with regards to transferring technology. On the other hand, 
when American companies  gave advice on launching satellites to China, it prompted an in-
depth report on technology transfer to China. The differences are striking. It is clear that the 
Soviet Union had a much more advanced space program than China, which leads us to the 
first conclusion: space cooperation is more likely if the rivals are equally advanced in space 
technology as this minimizes technology transfer. 
 A major reason for non-cooperation can be gleaned from the Moon Treaty and 
America's relation with China. Internal political resistance can end space collaboration, even 
when the government has already agreed with cooperation. The American democratic 
system ensures space policy is less important than ideological or economic politics. Space 
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policy by experts can generally succeed if there is no internal resistance due to a lack of 
interest. But if some resistance is organized it can lead to major policy decisions regardless 
of expert opinion, such as with both the Moon Treaty and the 2011 ban on cooperation with 
China. The US government agreed on the Moon Treaty, and its refusal to sign it harmed its 
interests in both space law and in other international negotiations. International Relations 
Theory often focuses on the interests of states, but it is clear that in regards to space the 
interests of the government can become secondary to the sometimes unrelated interests of 
the democratic system. 
 Further reasons for cooperation are a wish to maintain the stability of the global 
order, such as with the ISS and the space laws, and if cooperating with one rival can weaken 
a stronger rival, such as with US cooperation with China to weaken the Soviet Union. Rivals 
may not cooperate if strategic military interests collide and a climate of non-cooperation 
may make cooperation difficult despite good reasons. But these reasons are already well-
known among academics and are far from exclusive to space cooperation.  
 The main conclusions of this thesis can be used for International Relations Theory to 
theorize about the role of technology and military capabilities in cooperation, and about the 
role of internal politics in international affairs, especially in geopolitical theatres such as 
space relations. The real difficulty for mankind to work together in outer space may not be in 
our cultural differences, our conflicts or rivalries, but in our national politics. 
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